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FIRE INSURANCE RECOVERY RIGHTS OF
THE FORECLOSING MORTGAGEE: IS HIS
LIEN LOST IN THE ASHES?
I. Introduction
A mortgagee's security is affected by changes in the market value
of the mortgaged premises.' Fire damage,2 which diminishes its
value, may erode the mortgagee's ability to safeguard his invest-
ment because the premises often must be sold for less than the out-
standing debt should the mortgagee be forced to foreclose on his
lien. Consequently, fire insurance policies invariably contain a
"standard mortgage clause" separately insuring the mortgagee "as
his interest may appear."' The standard mortgage clause further
provides that the insurable interest of the mortgagee "shall not be
invalidated by act of foreclosure." ' However, where loss precedes a
foreclosure action or occurs during the pendency thereof, the mort-
gagee may not be fully indemnified.
This Note will explore the question of the mortgagee's insurable
interest under the standard mortgage clause as the process of fore-
closure ripens his status from that of mortgagee to that of property
owner. It will further examine how such changes in status can ex-
tinguish the mortgagee's interest and will discuss the principal ar-
guments raised against the prevailing rules.
1. For centuries, the personal responsibility and financial strength of a prospective mort-
gagor was the determining factor in a mortgagee's decision whether to extend credit to the
mortgagor. With the development of modem real estate financing, however, the mortgagor's
personal financial status has become less important; mortgagees now seek the collateral of
real property as security for a loan. C. WILTSIE, REAL PROPERTY MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE § 1
(5th ed. 1939) [hereinafter cited as WILTSIE].
2. While the standard mortgage clause discussed herein is only mandatory in policies of
fire insurance, contracting parties are of course free to extend the protection it provides to
other types of homeowner's losses. N.Y. INS. LAW § 168(5), lines 25-41 (McKinney Supp.
1979).
3. See note 19 infra.
4. Id.
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II. Background
A. The Standard Fire Insurance Policy
Prior to the end of the nineteenth century, each insurer drew up
a unique contract to be used by that company for insuring property
against loss by fire. Insurers often made these contracts compli-
cated to confuse insureds and to keep them ignorant of their rights
under the policy.' Policies were frequently revised to mitigate the
effect of judicial decisions adverse to the insurer' and eventually
became so unnecessarily complex that the attorneys who drafted
the policies had difficulty ascertaining what losses were covered.7
The complexity and widespread variation among policies made
claims adjustment so difficult that even the insurance companies
favored the development of a uniform contract.8 A standard policy
form was first enacted in Connecticut in 1867, but was repealed the
following year The first standard policy in which terms were rig-
idly prescribed by statute was adopted by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts in 1873, but its use was optional.'0 Michigan and
New Hampshire, in 1881 and 1885 respectively, passed statutes au-
thorizing the preparation of standard policies." In 1886, the New
York Board of Fire Underwriters'2 proposed a standard policy
5. E. VAUGHAN & C. ELLIOTr, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 355 (2d ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as VAUGHAN & ELLIOTT]. "As if it were feared that someone would, in spite
of [the incomprehensible language] discover the meaning of the contract, the policy was
printed in extremely small type and long, crowded lines, so that 'the perusal of it was made
physically difficult, painful and injurious.'. . . The size of print in fire policies is now pre-
scribed by law nearly everywhere." R. RIEGEL, J. MILLER & A. WILLIAMS, JR., INSURANCE
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 144 (6th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as RIEGEL, MILLER &
WILLIAMS].
6. Some companies attemped to devise policies which would impose as little liability
upon themselves as possible. RIEGEL, MILLER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 144.
7. VAUGHAN & ELLIOr, supra note 5, at 355.
8. Id.
9. W. VANCE, LAW OF INSURANCE 57 n.5 (3d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as VANCE.]
10. Id. at 57.
11. Id. The Michigan statute was declared unconstitutional in 1905 on the ground that
allowing the Commissioner of Insurance to fix such rules was an improper delegation of a
legislative power. King v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 140 Mich. 258, 103 N.W. 616 (1905). Simi-
lar statutes in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Missouri were invalidated on the
same ground. Other states avoided constitutional challenges by having the legislature adopt
Commissioner-proposed rules. VANCE, supra note 9, at 59.
12. The Board was assisted-by the National Board of Fire Underwriters, the State Super-
intendent of Insurance, and distinguished members of the New York insurance bar. VANCE,
supra note 9, at 58.
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which was adopted in 1887 as the only form permissible in the
State of New York. 3 The "New York Standard Fire Policy" gradu-
ally gained widespread acceptance throughout the United States. It
was revised in 1918 and again in 1943,14 and continues to be used in
most jurisdictions. Twelve states use forms with insignificant varia-
tions from the New York Standard Policy"5 and four have different
forms. 6
There are several advantages to a standard fire policy. Every in-
surer issues the same basic contract of insurance, tailored by minor
variations to fit the needs of each case. Judicial decisions gradually
define the terms contained in the policy and the public gains famil-
iarity with these terms. Discrepencies between different policies are
decreased, claims adjustment is facilitated, and the volume of liti-
gation is reduced.' 7
B. The Standard Mortgage Clause
A mortgagee generally requires a mortgagor to procure a fire pol-
icy as a condition for financing the purchase. As explained,' 8 this
policy is standard. Virtually all fire insurance policies contain a
"standard mortgage clause"' 9 which protects the interest of the
13. N.Y. INS. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1966).
14. RIEGEL, MILLER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 144; VAUGHAN & ELUOT, supra note 5,
at 355. The policy was also known as the "New York Standard Form." Id.
15. California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, New Mex-
ico, North Dakota, South Carolina and Vermont. See generally Comment, Arson Fraud:
Criminal Prosecution and Insurance Law, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541, 570 (1979).
16. Massachusetts, Minnesota, Texas, and Wisconsin.
17. RIEGEL, MILLER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 144.
18. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text.
19. The standard mortgage clause is sometimes referred to as the "New York Standard"
or the "union mortgage clause." An example of such a clause, in common use, is as follows:
Loss, if any, under this policy shall be payable to the aforesaid as mortgagee (or
trustee) as interest may appear under all present or future mortgages upon the prop-
erty herein described in which the aforesaid may have an interest as mortgagee (or
trustee), in order of precedence of said mortgages, and this insurance, as to the inter-
est of the mortgagee (or trustee) only therein, shall not be invalidated by any act or
neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within described property, nor by any foreclo-
sure or other proceedings or notice of sale relating to the property, nor by any change
in the title or ownership of the property, nor by the occupation of the premises for
purposes more hazardous than are permitted by this policy; provided that in case the
mortgagor or owner shall neglect to pay any premium due under this policy, the mort-
gagee (or trustee) shall, on demand, pay the same.
Provided, also that the mortgagee (or trustee) shall notify this Company of any
change of ownership or occupancy or increase of hazard which shall come to the
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mortgaged premises. The policy insures the mortgagee "as his in-
terest may appear" 0 despite any act or neglect which would violate
the terms of the policy on the part of the mortgagor."' This clause
effectively gives the mortgagee a "separate contract of insurance"
with the mortgagor's insurance carrier, 2 thereby allowing the mort-
gagee to bring suit on the policy in his own name. 3 In addition, a
standard mortgage clause protects the interest of the mortgagee
knowledge of said mortgagee (or trustee) and, unless permitted by this policy, it shall
be noted thereon and the mortgagee (or trustee) shall, on demand, pay the premium
for such increased hazard for the term of the use thereof; otherwise this policy shall be
null and void.
This Company reserves the right to cancel this policy at any time as provided by its
terms, but in such case this policy shall continue in force for the benefit only of the
mortgagee (or truitee) for ten days after notice to the mortgagee (or trustee) of such
cancellation and shall then cease, and this Company shall have the right, on like
notice to cancel this agreement.
Whenever this Company shall pay the mortgagee (or trustee) any sum for loss
under this policy and shall claim that, as to the mortgagor or owner, no liability
therefor existed, this Company shall, to the extent of such payment, be thereupon
legally subrogated to all the rights of the party to whom such payment shall be made,
under all securities held as collateral to the mortgage debt, or may, at its option, pay
to the mortgagee (or trustee) the whole principal due or to grow due on the mortgage
with interest, and shall thereupon receive a full assignment and transfer of the mort-
gage and of all such other securities; but no subrogation shall impair the right of the
mortgagee (or trustee) to recover the full amount of said mortgagee's (or trustee's)
claim.
Connally, Mortgagor-Mortgagee Problems and the Standard Mortgage Clause, 13 FORUM
786, 787-88 n.4 (1978) (emphasis supplied).
20. 6A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE § 4164 at 477 n.43 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as APPLEMAN]; 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 42:648 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as
COUCH].
21. The standard mortgage clause applies to acts or omissions of the mortgagor previous
or subsequent to the formation of the contract. Stockton v. Atlantic Fire Ins. Co., 207 N.C.
43, 175 S.E. 695 (1934). 11 CoucH, supra note 20, §§ 42:658, :687. VANCE, supra note 9, at
776.
22. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Associates Capital Corp., 313 So. 2d 404, 407 (Miss. Sup.
Ct. 1975); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 437 Pa. 463, 263 A.2d 448
(1970); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Mo.
App. 1970). This is, of course, subject to the qualification that no separate contract arises if
the mortgagee rejects the policy. Continental Ins. Co. v. Ferro, 109 N.J. Eq. 374, 157 A. 558
(1931). However, this "separate contract" is not a complete contract in itself. 11 COUCH
supra note 20, § 42:650. The mortgagee may be viewed more as a third party creditor-benefi-
ciary rather than as a separate party to the contract of insurance. Walker v. Queen Ins. Co.,
136 S.C. 144, 134 S.E. 263 (1926).
23. RIEGEL, MILLER & WILIAMS, supra note 5, at 52-53. Where the mortgagor obligated
himself to insure the mortgagee but did not, equity will treat the policy as having contained
a mortgage clause and thus entitle mortgagee to bring suit thereunder. Andrello v. Nation-
wide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 29 A.D.2d 489, 289 N.Y.S.2d 293 (4th Dep't 1968).
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even if the policy was itself void as to the mortgagor ab initio,2* and
even if the mortgage suffered no actual loss. 2 The clause is en-
forceable whether or not physically attached to the policy,"6 and
whether or not the mortgagee was aware of its existence.Y
This separate contract grants the mortgagee several advantages.
Foremost among these is the reasonable certainty that his loan will
be repaid by someone. Should the mortgagor default on his pay-
ments and the mortgagee is unable to satisfy a judgment of foreclo-
sure by sale because destruction has diminished the value of the
premises, the mortgagee may, in theory,2s use the insurance pro-
ceeds to satisfy the mortgage obligation.2 In addition, the mortga-
gee preserves his interest unimpaired by the subrogation rights of
the insurer2 Finally, the mortgagee is entitled to ten days notice of
cancellation of the policy by the carrier, instead of the five days
notice which must be given to the mortgagor. 31 In return for the
extensive protection provided by the standard mortgage clause, the
mortgagee assumes relatively little responsibility. He is obligated
only to pay the premium if it is not paid by the mortgagor 32 and to
notify the insurer of any change in ownership or increase in hazard
within his knowledge. 33
24. Oklahoma State Union of Farmers' Educ. & Coop. Union v. Folsom, 325 P.2d 1053
(Okla. Sup. Ct. 1958); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Fin. Co., 297 P.2d 403
(Okla. Sup. Ct. 1956); 11 COUCH, supra note 20, § 42:695.
25. Savarese v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 260 N.Y. 45, 182 N.E. 665 (1932). The mortgagee
will suffer no actual loss when premises have been restored in value or even increased be-
yond what they were worth prior to a fire. Nevertheless, mortgagee may not lose his right to
recover insurance proceeds. Id. But see N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 254(4) (McKinney Supp.
1979).
26. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 57 Okla. 237, 244, 156 P. 638, 640 (1916);
cf. Tarleton v. DeVeuve, 113 F.2d 290, 297 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 691 (1941).
27. 113 F.2d at 297.
28. As noted herein, the mortgagee does not always recover his loss. See notes 66-75 infra
and accompanying text.
29. But see notes 66-75 infra and accompanying text.
30. RIEGEL, MILLER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 53.
31. Aetna State Bank v. Maryland Cas. Co., 345 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Ill. 1972); RIEGEL,
MILLER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 53.
32. In the event the mortgagee fails to pay a premium not paid by the mortgagor, the
policy lapses and neither party has his interest protected. Courts are divided on whether the
clause imposes a contractual duty on the mortgagee to pay premiums or merely gives the
mortgagee an option to keep the insurance in force. VANCE, supra note 9, at 776.
33. RIEGEL, MILLER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 52; Lev, Mortgagees and Insurers: The
Legal Nuts and Bolts of Their Relationship, 12 FORUM 1012, 1014 (1977). However, if the
consequences of a mortgagee's failure to give such notice to insurer are not specified in the
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Mortgagees have received this advantageous treatment because
they have a recognized right to protection34 and are generally un-
able to control -the acts of the mortgagor. 5 Moreover, insurers view
mortgagees as desirable 'customers because mortgagees provide
them with a large volume of business" and share with the insurer
an interest in maintaining the value of the insured premises. 37
The standard mortgage clause must be distinguished from the
older and now little-used loss payable clause," wherein the mortga-
gee is not protected by a separate contract of insurance.39 Under
that clause, the mortgagee can recover only to the extent that the
mortgagor would be entitled to collect on the policy. This deriva-
tive interest of the mortgagee will be invalidated upon any act or
neglect on the part of the mortgagor.'" The mortgagee is viewed
only as an appointee to receive said insurance funds4 as no greater
or different burden is assumed by the insurer; the clause merely
designates to whom the loss will be paid."2 A second critical distinc-
policy, the mortgagee may still be protected absent notice. See Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Conley, 498 S.W.2d 122, 127 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
34. 5A APPLEMAN, supra note 20, § 3381; 11 COUCH, supra note 20, § 42:683.
35. RIEGEL, MILLER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 53.
36. The mortgagee often procures the insurance for the mortgagor and, consequently, can
direct the flow of his business as he chooses.
37. Mortgagees are usually large lending institutions or responsible individuals likely to
keep the insurance in force and to guard against destruction of their security interests, al-
though they are under no duty to do so. 11 COUCH, supra note 20, § 42:653.
38. The loss payable clause is also referred to as the "simple loss payable" or "open
mortgage clause." 11 COUCH, supra note 20, § 42:648.
39. Jurists writing opinions on mortgage clause cases frequently use the terms "standard
mortgage clause" and "loss payable clause" interchangeably. This leads to unnecessary con-
fusion among courts and law review writers. See, e.g., Note, Foreclosure, Loss, and the
Proper Distribution of Insurance Proceeds Under Open and Standard Mortgage Clauses:
Some Observations, 7 VAL. L. REv. 485, 489 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Observations]. Al-
though admittedly an over-simplification, the two clauses have been distinguished on the
basis that the loss payable clause is subject to such defenses as the insurer may have against
the mortgagor while the standard clause is not subject to such defenses. COUCH, supra note
20, § 42:649. In addition, a loss payable clause may not contain the term "as interest may
appear." Id. In case of doubt, the clause should be construed to be a standard clause. Id. §
42:684.
40. 5A APPLEMAN, supra note 20, § 3401; 11 COUCH, supra note 20, §§ 42:660,:671; VANCE,
supra note 9, at 775.
41. Kimberly & Carpenter v. National Liberty Ins. Co., 35 Del. 63, 67, 157 A. 730, 732
(1931); Southern States Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Napier, 22 Ga. App. 361, 96 S.E. 15 (1918);
11 COUCH, supra note 20, § 42:660. Contra, Walker v. Queen Ins. Co., 136 S.C. 144, 134 S.E.
263 (1926).
42. Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. Langhorne, 146 F.2d 237, 241 (8th Cir. 1945); German Ins.
Co. v. Hayden, 21 Colo. 127, 40 P. 453 (1895); Wharen v. Markle Banking & Trust Co., 145
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tion between standard and loss payable clauses is that, under the
latter, the timing of foreclosure with respect to loss does not affect
a mortgagee's recovery. Whether loss follows foreclosure, or foreclo-
sure follows loss, once the mortgage debt is fully extinguished the
mortgagee's rights under the insurance contract are terminated.43
This is not the rule with respect to the standard mortgage clause.
III. Recovery Rights of a Foreclosing Mortgagee
The mortgagee's right to foreclose" on his security accrues upon
default by the mortgagor on one of the mortgage terms. 5 An action
in foreclosure is commenced by serving a copy of the summons and
complaint on all necessary parties." The mortgagee will then pro-
cure a judgment of foreclosure directing that the mortgaged prem-
ises be sold under the direction of the county sheriff or a referee."7
The judgment of foreclosure typically includes costs of bringing the
action and expenses of the sale in addition to the outstanding
mortgage debt plus interest." Sale is then held at public auction in
the county in which the mortgaged premises are situated." It is a
common practice for the mortgagee to bid in the amount of his
judgment, presuming the premises are worth at least that much, at
the foreclosure sale. If the mortgagee is the highest bidder, he sim-
ply "buys back" the premises" and becomes the owner, thereby
extinguishing the mortgage debt." If another puchaser outbids the
Pa. Super. 99, 102, 20 A.2d 885, 887 (1941).
43. Reynolds v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 128 Cal. 16, 60 P. 467, 468 (1900);
Observations, supra note 39, at 489.
44. Foreclosure has been defined as "a procedure whereby at a definite time the title to
the mortgaged premises is transferred absolutely from the mortgagor and his subsequent
lienors to a purchaser .... " WiLTsE, supra note 1, § 2.
45. WILTSIE, supra note 1, § 39. In the absence of an acceleration clause, the right to
foreclose generally does not vest until the law day of the debt secured by the mortgage. Id.
However, virtually all mortgage instruments contain an acceleration clause.
46. Note, The Mortgagee and the Federal Government, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 120, 121
(1964). In New York, the procedure is governed by articles 13 and 14 of the Real Property
Actions and Proceedings Law.
47. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTS § 1351 (McKinney 1979). New York also provides for
foreclosure by advertisement, wherein notice of sale is made by publication. Id. §§ 1401-
1402.
48. Id. §§ 1351, 1431, 1432.
49. Id. § 1407.
50. When the mortgagee purchases his security at a foreclosure sale, cash is not ex-
changed. His payment is merely reflected by a bookkeeping transaction.
51. The mortgagee will usually thereafter sell the property to recover his investment.
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mortgagee, the sale proceeds are first used to satisfy the judgment
of foreclosure. The mortgagor is then entitled to the surplus of the
sale price over the judgment52 and the highest bidder thereafter be-
comes owner in fee.53 If the highest bid at sale, whether made by
the mortgagee or a third person, is less than the judgment of fore-
closure, the mortgagee may assert a deficiency judgment for the
difference against the mortgagor."
A complex set of rules has been developed to determine the
amount of the mortgagee's recovery under the standard mortgage
clause when a loss occurs. The mortgagee's recovery is limited to
his interest "as it may appear."55 This interest will depend on the
timing of the foreclosure action in relation to the loss and the ex-
tent to which the mortgagee has had his debt satisfied.
A. Where Foreclosure Sale Precedes Loss
Insurance companies attempted to escape liability to standard
fire policy mortgagees who have "bought in" their interest at fore-
closure and subsequently suffered loss or destruction to the subject
premises by maintaining that the term "as interest may appear" in
the standard mortgage clause protects only the interest held at the
time the policy was issued. 6 A mortgagee, it was argued, was in-
sured only in his capacity as mortgagee and not as owner. 7 Mort-
gagees maintained that the term in the standard mortgage clause
which states that "the interest of the mortgagee shall not be invali-
dated by act of foreclosure"5 protects their interest where foreclo-
sure precedes the loss. Courts have consistently upheld the mortga-
gee's position."'
In Shores v. Rabon,'0 for example, the Supreme Court of North
52. The surplus is termed "equity" and actually paid into the supreme court, N.Y. REAL
PROP. AcTs. § 1441 (McKinney 1979), and a petition must be brought by the mortgagor to
recover his equity. Id. § 1442.
53. Title passes only after the officer conducting the sale executes a deed to the pur-
chaser. Id. § 1353.
54. Id. § 1371.
55. See note 19 supra.
56. E.g., Guardian Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Reserve Ins. Co., 2 Ill. App. 3d 77, 78, 276
N.E.2d 109, 110 (1971).
57. Id. at 79, 276 N.E.2d at 111.
58. See note 19 supra.
59. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 291 Ala. 193, 197, 279 So. 2d 460,
462-63 (1973); Haskin v. Greene, 205 Or. 140, 149, 286 P.2d 128, 133 (1955); City of Chicago
v. Maynur, 28 Il. App. 3d 751, 755, 329 N.E.2d 312, 315 (1975).
60. 251 N.C. 790, 112 S.E.2d 556 (1960).
[Vol. VIII
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Carolina rejected the argument that foreclosure extinguished a
mortgagee's interest under the policy. The Shores court viewed ac-
quisition of title as an increase in interest rather than as a change
in ownership." Similarly, in Union Central Life Insurance Co. v.
Codington County Farmers Fire & Lightning Mutual Insurance
Co.,"2 the Supreme Court of South Dakota emphatically rejected
the argument that the word "mortgagee" as used in the standard
clause refers only to one who remains in that capacity. The court
stated that "if it had been intended that the protection of the
mortgagee should cease with the foreclosure of the mortgage . . .
that intention would have been expressed in unequivocal words. '6 3
Thus, where foreclosure precedes loss, the separate contract of in-
surance arising under the standard mortgage clause will fully pro-
tect 64 the mortgagee against loss occurring subsequent to the fore-
closure on his lien.
B. Where Foreclosure Sale Follows Loss
In most jurisdictions, the mortgagee who commences foreclosure
proceedings after the mortgaged premises are damaged or de-
stroyed will lose his insurable interest to the extent that the judg-
ment is satisfied by purchase at sale.65 The New York Court of Ap-
61. Id. at 795, 112 S.E.2d at 560. By refusing to hold that ownership of the premises had
transferred to the mortgagee, the court, in effect, absolved the mortgagee from penalty for
failure to notify the carrier of change in ownership, as required by the policy. Id. at 796, 112
S.E.2d at 561.
62. 66 S.D. 561, 287 N.W. 46 (1939).
63. Id. at 565, 287 N.W. at 50.
64. The mortgagee is protected to the extent of his insurable interest, a fundamental
tenet of insurance law. American Ice Co. v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 188 U.S. 626, 629
(1903). See also Hagan v. Scottish Ins. Co., 186 U.S. 423, 433 (1902); Sturm v. Boker, 150
U.S. 312, 333 (1893). Generally, the rule applied to property insurance is that an insurable
interest vests in one who derives benefit from the property or who would suffer loss from its
destruction; title, a security or a possessory interest is irrelevant. Harrison v. Fortlage, 161
U.S. 57, 65 (1896); Hooper v. Robinson, 98 U.S. 528, 537 (1879); Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Edmister, 412 F.2d 351, 353 (8th Cir. 1969). Thus, the mortgagee is insured "as his inter-
est may appear." The rationale for predicating rights under the policy on interest in the
property insured is that one who stands to recover financially should suffer concomitant loss,
lest he fraudulently cause the policy to become payable. See Pinzur, Insurable Interest: A
Search for Consistency, 46 INS. COUNSEL J. 109 (1979). Some commentators have advocated
that insurers who accept premiums when they know or should know that an insurable inter-
est is lacking should be estopped from raising the defense of lack of insurable interest. See,
e.g., Note, Insurance: Insurable Interest in Oklahoma-Time for a Change, 31 OKLA. L. REV.
718 (1978).
65. Mann v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 541 F.2d 819, 823 (9th Cir. 1976); Insurance Co. of
1979-80]
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peals enunciated the majority rule in Whitestone Savings & Loan
Association v. Allstate Insurance Co."6 At a foreclosure sale one
year after a fire damaged the premises, plaintiff-mortgagee bid in
the full amount of the balance then owing on the mortgage. 67
Whitestone's bid was for an amount greater than the actual market
value of the damaged premises. Therefore, on resale, Whitestone
received less than it had "paid" for the premises." The mortgagee
brought an action against the insurer of the premises for payment
of insurance proceeds payable due to the loss. The court, relying on
Rosenbaum v. Funcannon," held that Whitestone did not retain
any insurable interest entitling it to sue on the policy. In Rosen-
baum, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit distinguished
foreclosure, which does not extinguish mortgagee's interest per se,
from the satisfaction of the mortgage debt: "[E]xtinguishment of a
mortgage or deed of trust by sale of the property at foreclosure does
not necessarily extinguish the debt itself. Only to the extent that
North America v. Citizens ins. Co., 425 F.2d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir. 1970); Rosenbaum
v. Funcannon, 308 F.2d 680, 685 (9th Cir. 1962); Lutheran Bhd. v. Hooten, 237 So. 2d 23, 24
(Fla. App. 1970); Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Mildenberger, 359 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. App.
1962); Power Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Ajax Fire Ins. Co., 110 N.J.L. 256, 164 A. 410 (1933);
Whitestone Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Allstate Ins. Co., 28 N.Y.2d 332, 270 N.E.2d 694, 321
N.Y.S.2d 862 (1971); Gattavara v. General Ins. Co., 166 Wash. 691, 8 P.2d 421 (1932). See
also APPELMAN, supra note 20, § 3403; 5 COUCH, supra note 20, §§ 29:75 to :77; 55 AM. JUR. 2n
Mortgages §§ 274-83 (1971); 38 N.Y. Jua. Mortgages and Deeds of Trust § 143 (1964). Courts
are unconcerned with the results of a resale, regardless of whether the mortgagee profits or
suffers a loss thereby. For example, a Tennessee court held that mortgagees who foreclosed
after fire loss, bought the property for $250 and later sold it for $7000, thereby making a
profit considerably more than their outstanding debt did not lose their right of recovery.
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis, 389 S.W.2d 941 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).
66. 28 N.Y.2d 332, 270 N.E.2d 694, 321 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1971). The interpretation of
standard fire policy matters by the courts of New York is given great weight. See, e.g., Good-
man v. Quaker City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 F.2d 844, 845 (lst Cir. 1958).
67. 28 N.Y.2d at 334, 270 N.E.2d at 695, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
68. Interviews with members of the real estate and banking bar: John A. Burns, Jr.,
Esq., James G. Meade, Esq., George J. Meade, Esq., John H. Munley, Esq. and William J.
Nielsen, Esq., Great Neck, New York (January 4, 1980).
69. 308 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1962). Some commentators, e.g., Observations, supra note 39,
at 496, observe that the rationale in Rosenbaum is supported by loss payable mortgage
clause cases; e.g., Reynolds v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 128 Cal. 16, 60 P. 467
(1900). If true, Whitestone and its progeny may be based upon a faulty premise. However,
there is one major caveat: judges often use the term"loss payable" in an opinion on a stan-
dard mortgage clause case even though the two clauses are radically different. For example,
the Whitestone court repeatedly refers to the clause in question as the "loss payable clause"
despite the fact that it was clearly a standard clause. 28 N.Y.2d 332, 270 N.E.2d 694, 321
N.Y.S.2d 862 (passim).
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the mortgagee receives payment upon the debt through the foreclo-
sure is the debt itself extinguished." 0
The loss/foreclosure rule is premised on the rationale that be-
cause the mortgagee is entitled to only one satisfaction of his debt,
the bidding in of the debt amount to purchase the mortgaged prop-
erty, which thereby cuts off lower bidders, always constitutes a sat-
isfaction of the debt." The mortgagee, it is reasoned, has the choice
of either satisfying his lien by foreclosure or looking to the insurer
for indemnification." He is free to pursue either remedy or a com-
bination thereof to the extent that his recovery does not exceed the
judgment of foreclosure. The mortgagee's successful bid for less
than the amount of the mortgage debt would leave "a deficiency
for which the mortgagor would be obligated and from which there
would survive an insurable interest." 3 Because the mortgagee bid
in the amount of the judgment, there was no deficiency to define
the extent of his insurable interest. To permit the. mortgagee to re-
cover insurance proceeds, it was argued, might result in a double
recovery. Further, the result in Whitestone ostensibly guards
against fraud by the mortgagee. The court, in Whitestone, was con-
cerned that, by allowing the mortgagee effectively to cut off or dis-
courage lower bidders by bidding in more than the value of the
property and then to try to assert that the property was in fact
worth less "encourages fraud [and] creates uncertainty as to the
mortgagor's rights."" The court emphasized that the bank had vol-
untarily converted the mortgagors' debt into a fee interest by
purchase at the sale 5 and that Whitestone had ample opportunity
to tailor its bid to reflect the value of the property it was
purchasing.
This rule was extended slightly in New York by Moke Realty
Corp. v. Whitestone Savings & Loan Association." Moke Realty
70. Rosenbaum v. Funcannon, 308 F.2d 680, 684 (9th Cir. 1962).
71. Whitestone Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Allstate Ins. Co., 28 N.Y.2d at 335, 270 N.E.2d
at 696, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 864. r!1
72. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 291 Ala. 193, 198, 279 So. 2d 460, 463
(1973).
73. 28 N.Y.2d at 335, 270 N.E.2d at 696, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
74. Id. at 337, 270 N.E.2d at 697, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 866. The court may have assumed that
Whitestone acted in bad faith in bidding on the mortgagors' premises. However, this is un-
supported by the facts. See notes 96-98 infra and accompanying text.
75. 28 N.Y.2d at 335, 270 N.E.2d at 696, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
76. 82 Misc. 2d 396, 370 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 1005, 382
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Corp. (Moke) owned a restaurant building which formed the secur-
ity for several mortgages held by Whitestone. After the restaurant
was totally destroyed by fire, Moke defaulted on its mortgage pay-
ments and Whitestone foreclosed. Whitestone obtained a judgment
of foreclosure for $50,488.13 and bought the property at sale for
$26,000, leaving a difference of $24,488.13 between the mortgage
debt and the amount it realized on the sale." Whitestone should
have had little trouble in turning to Moke's insurer to satisfy its
deficiency. However, the trial judge ruled that, because Whitestone
had failed to enter a deficiency judgment within the ninety day
time limit prescribed by section 1371 of the Real Property Actions
and Proceedings Law,78 it was estopped from attaching insurance
proceeds to satisfy the deficiency." The statute provides that: "If
no motion for a deficiency [is] made . . . the proceeds of the sale
regardless of amount shall be deemed to be in full satisfaction of
the mortgage debt and no right to recover any deficiency in any
action or proceeding shall exist."" The judge held that under
Whitestone v. Allstate the mortgagee's insurable interest in the
property was terminated and recovery on the fire policy was de-
nied. Moke was unanimously affirmed by the appellate division 8
and by the court of appeals.82
The State of Georgia has a statute83 similar to New York's sec-
tion 1371, but unlike section 1371, it does not operate to extinguish
a debt upon untimely filing; it merely limits the creditor's reme-
dies." In addition, the Georgia statute does not prevent a creditor
N.Y.S.2d 289 (2d Dep't 1976), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 954, 363 N.E.2d 587, 394 N.Y.S.2d 881
(1977).
77. Id. at 397; 370 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
78. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. § 1371 (McKinney 1979).
79. 82 Misc. 2d at 397-98; 370 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
80. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. § 1371(3) (McKinney 1979). The statute implicitly works
to the benefit of the insurer as well as the mortgagor.
81. 51 A.D.2d 1005, 382 N.Y.S.2d 289 (2d Dep't 1976).
82. 41 N.Y.2d 954, 363 N.E.2d 587, 394 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1977).
83. GA. CODE ANN. '§ 67-1503 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides:
When any real estate is sold on foreclosure . . . and at such sale said real estate does
not bring the amount of the debt secured by [the] deed, mortgage, or contract, no
action may be taken to obtain a deficiency judgment unless the person instituting the
foreclosure proceedings shall, within 30 days after such sale, report the sale to the
judge of the superior court of the county in which the land lies for confirmation and
approval, and obtains an order of confirmation and approval thereon.
84. Power v. Wren, 198 Ga. 316, 322, 31 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1944); Marler v. Rockmart
Bank, 146 Ga. App. 548, 549, 246 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1978); Turpin v. North Am. Acceptance
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from pursuing another contractual security on the debt. 5 In Cal-
vert Fire Insurance Co. v. Environs Development Corp. ," the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying Georgia law, decided
whether a mortgagee who had bought back the property for the full
amount of the mortgage principal plus interest then owing, but ex-.
clusive of attorney's fees allegedly due, could assert a deficiency
against the insurer. As in Moke, the mortgagee had failed to pro-
cure, in timely fashion, a judicial confirmation and approval of the
sale. The court held that the deficiency was recoverable. It rea-
soned that the mortgagee's "status as loss-payee gives it no less a
separate contractual remedy than would an additional security
deed on other property"; 7 because the Georgia statute does not
prohibit such a remedy, the mortgagee may look to the insurer to
recover the deficiency.8 1
It might initially appear that the Calvert court has impaired the
effectiveness Georgia's deficiency judgment statute. Proponents of
the Moke rationale that recovery rights are lost by inaction would
mandate that deficiency judgment statutes be complied with
before any or all rights arising thereunder are honored. Calvert,
however, is more consistent with the concept of independent recov-
ery provided by the standard mortgage clause. 8 Moreover, the
Whitestone/Moke reasoning represents an unholy marriage of con-
tract and property law. A deficiency judgment statute" is applica-
ble to the foreclosure process, which arises out of the law of.real
property. Conversely, an insurance policy is governed by contract
law. It is an agreement by the insurer to indemnify the mortgagee
on the occurrence of a loss. Arguably, it is illogical to allow nonper-
formance of an executory and independent contract by operation of
a statute governing rights arising under the law of property. The
majority of jurisdictions, however, have rejected this argument and
refuse to distinguish contract law from real property law in this
Corp., 119 Ga. App. 212, 217, 166 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1969).
85. Salter v. Bank of Commerce, 189 Ga. 328, 335, 6 S.E.2d 290, 293 (1939).
86. 601 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1979).
87. Id. at 855.
88. Id. The only deficiency in Calvert was for attorney's fees because the mortgagee had
purchased the premises for the full amount of his lien exclusive of said fees. However, the
court indicated that per its reasoning, the failure to seek timely confirmation and approval
of the sale would not extinguish mortgagee's right to recover on any deficiency. Id. at 856.
89. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
90. E.g., N.Y. R&AL PRoP. AcTs. § 1371 (McKinney 1979).
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area.' These jurisdictions consistently hold that to allow a mortga-
gee who purchases the mortgaged premises to recover insurance
proceeds thereon would result in a double recovery. Under this
rule, the insurer will presumably not avoid his contractual obliga-
tion because the mortgagor, if not party to the instant action, can
sue the insurer at a later date.'2
The New York courts ' 3 apparent preference for deficiency judg-
ments as a method of fully satisfying the mortgagee's judgment of
foreclosure ignores the formidable obstacles which deficiency judg-
ment statutes place in the mortgagee's path. Commentators"' and
practicing attorneys 5 note that, at least in New York, courts are
reluctant to grant deficiency judgments. This is undoubtedly a re-
sult of the statute's 9 attempt to mitigate the hardship which re-
sults to a mortgagor from a forced sale. 7 The statute guards
against the mortgagee's bidding at sale a figure much lower than
the fair market value of the premises ("chilling the bid"). The pur-
chaser's bid, under the New York statute, becomes only one of two
determinants of the extent of the deficiency. The deficiency is de-
termined by deducting from the foreclosure judgment the higher of
the sale price or the fair market value as determined by the court.
It has been held that the New York statute is designed to estab-
lish a new "equitable standard" in place of market value." Hence,
91. See notes 128-33 infra and accompanying text.
92. The mortgagor may sue provided the policy has not lapsed as to him.
93. See Whitestone Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Allstate Ins. Co., 28 N.Y.2d 332, 270 N.E.2d
694, 321 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1971); Grady v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 69 A.D.2d 668, 419 N.Y.S.2d 565
(2d Dep't 1979); Moke Realty Corp. v. Whitestone Say. & Loan Ass'n, 82 Misc. 2d 396,
370 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 1005, 382 N.Y.S.2d 289 (2d Dep't 1976),
aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 954, 363 N.E.2d 587, 394 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1977).
94. Case Note, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 1314 (1935); Case Note, 23 U. VA. L. REV. 718 (1937);
interview with the Honorable Robert T. Groh, New York, N.Y. (February 29, 1980).
95. See note 68 supra.
96. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1371 (McKinney 1979). The statute has been cited as
an example of "anti-deficiency legislation" which grew out of the great depression of the
1930's. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 528 (1979) [herein-
after cited as OSBORNE]. Other examples of such legislation include: CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §
726 (West 1955); IDAHO CODE § 6-108 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21-36 (1976); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 32-19-04, -06, -07 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686 (West 1960); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2621.1 (Purdon 1967); S.C. CODE §§ 29-3-660 - 29-3-760 (1976); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-47-16, 21-48-15, 21-49-27 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53, 57-1-32 (1953);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 61.12.060 (1961).
97. OSBORNE, supra note 96, at 528.
98. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1371(2) (McKinney 1979).
99. Heiman v. Bishop, 272 N.Y. 83, 86, 4 N.E.2d 944, 945 (1936).
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the courts have considerable discretion in determining market
value. In an effort to protect the mortgagor's interests, the "fair
market value"' ° is often established by the court at an inflated
figure. 'o
The inequity borne by mortgagees under the deficiency judgment
statutes is most evident in cases where there is a small difference
between the market value of the premises and the mortgagee's lien.
As a practical matter, the mortgagee will be dissuaded from pursu-
ing a deficiency judgment where the amount of potential recovery
is less than the expense of litigation.' 2 Consequently, the mortga-
gee must choose between either chilling his bid and risking non-
collection' 3 of the deficiency, or buying the property for the full
amount of his lien and risking loss on resale.
C. Where Loss Follows Foreclosure Judgment but Precedes
Foreclosure Sale
In Grady v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 104 the mortgagee's as-
signee'08 commenced foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgagor's
default and obtained a judgment of foreclosure in the amount of
$34,769.46.106 This figure included taxes and sewer rent paid by
mortgagee in addition to the unpaid mortgage debt, interest
thereon and costs and expenses of the foreclosure proceeding. 07
100. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. § 1371(2) (McKinney 1979).
101. Evidence of the fact that market value of the damaged premises can be inflated is
that "value" has been said to approximate tax assessments. G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 708 (2d
ed. 1970). This figure will usually be higher than post-loss value. Absent anti-deficiency leg-
islation, courts will not refuse to confirm a sale "on account of mere inadequacy of price
unless the inadequacy be so gross as to shock the conscience or raise a presumption of fraud
or unfairness." OSBORNE, supra note 96, at 496.
102. Non-compliance with statutory mechanics might invalidate an otherwise proper
claim. E.g., Moke Realty Corp. v. Whitestone Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 82 Misc. 2d 396, 370
N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 1005, 382 N.Y.S.2d 289 (2d Dep't 1976),
aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 954, 363 N.E.2d 587, 394 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1977).
103. Obtaining the judgment is not the mortgagee's only difficulty; he must satisfy the
same, which may prove impossible if asserted against an insolvent mortgagor.
104. 69 A.D.2d 668, 419 N.Y.S.2d 565 (2d Dep't 1979).
105. Plaintiff Grady was the trustee of the bond and mortgage, which had been assigned
to him by mortgagee Louis A. Droesch. Id. at 670-71, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
106. 69 A.D.2d at 672, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 568. Added to this figure is interest from the date-
of judgment. Id. For a definition of judgment of foreclosure see note 48 supra and accompa-
nying text.
107. Id. at 671 n.1, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 568 n.1. The appellate division denied plaintiff's
claim for $34,969.46 (which included the referee's statutory fee of $200.00 for conducting the
sale) on the grounds that the sale was never held and that in any event, since mortgagee was
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Before the foreclosure sale could be held, the property was dam-
aged by fire.' The mortgagee discontinued his foreclosure action
and commenced an action against the insurer for recovery under
the fire policy. 09 Defendant/insurer offered to settle with the plain-
tiff for $22,657.18, which represented the amount of the outstand-
ing mortgage balance plus interest from the date of last payment
until loss." ° Plaintiff declined, maintaining that the mortgagee's
insurable interest is measured by the amount of his lien as evi-
denced by the judgment of foreclosure. The Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of the mortgagee and
held that the mortgagee's insurable interest was equal to the judg-
ment of foreclosure.'' The court interpreted the phrase "as interest
may appear" to mean that the insurer "undertook to pay plaintiff
'to the extent of his lien or charge upon the premises' as it existed
on the date of the fire."" 2
A lesson to be learned from Grady is that a mortgagee "fortu-
nate" enough to have his premises destroyed after he obtains a
judgment of foreclosure may avoid the inconvenience of holding a
sale"' and thereby guarantee full recovery of his judgment. Consid-
ering the mortgagee's recognized right to elect his avenue of recov-
ery"' and the risks involved in seeking satisfaction of a deficiency
judgment,"' the easiest and safest way for a mortgagee to make
himself whole is to demand indemnification from the insurer before
a foreclosure sale. Therefore, the distinction between Grady and
Whitestone arguably penalizes mortgagees who have diligently ex-
not entitled to it, the fee was not part of his lien. Id. at 678, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
108. Id. at 673, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
109. Although the court supervises a foreclosure action, the mortgagee retains considera-
ble control over it. Before a sale can be held, the mortgagee must give notice. See note 47
supra.
110. 69 A.D.2d at 672, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
111. The extent of the loss was disputed. Plaintiff claimed the loss was total; defendant
claimed that the loss was $33,600.00. The case was remanded to determine the loss upon
which the insurer would be liable, id. at 678, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 572, and later settled. See
note 68 supra.
112. 69 A.D.2d at 674, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 569-70 (citations omitted).
113. Naturally, this presumes that loss and policy coverage exceeded the judgment of
foreclosure.
114. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 94-103 supra and accompanying text. See also Moke Realty Corp. v.
Whitestone Say. & Loan Ass'n, 82 Misc. 2d 396, 370 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd,




ercised the legal right of foreclosure.
In Morgan v. Ellenville Savings Bank,"' the mortgagor defaulted
on his obligation and the mortgagee commenced foreclosure pro-
ceedings. Prior to the entry of a judgment of foreclosure, the build-
ing on the premises was destroyed by fire. A judgment of foreclo-
sure was entered and the referee included in the terms of sale a
statement that if the mortgagee did not bid in the full amount of
his debt"' at sale, the referee would assign to the purchaser such
proceeds of insurance as might be payable by reason of the fire
loss."8 At sale, the mortgagee was the sole bidder and purchased
the property for the exact amount of his judgment. The mortgagee
argued that, because it was the purchaser, it should receive the
benefit of the referee's assignment clause, namely, the insurance
proceeds." ' The appellate division denied recovery and held that
because the mortgagee bid in the exact amount of its foreclosure
judgment at sale, under Whitestone it extinguished its recovery
rights, despite the fact that it suffered an actual loss of $11,000.110
The court noted that the referee was powerless to change the terms
of sale fixed by the judgment of foreclosure and thereby direct the
flow of insurance proceeds.'' Had the mortgagee not relied on the
referee's directions and simply refrained from bidding in at sale,
under the Grady rationale it would have avoided its $11,000 loss.
D. Where Loss Precedes Foreclosure Judgment
The New York courts have yet to be confronted with a case
where loss follows an act of default but precedes a judgment of
foreclosure and where, because of Grady, a sale will not be held.'
Grady held that, on its facts, the mortgagee's interest is equal to
the lien or charge upon the premises as it existed on the date of the
116. 55 A.D.2d 178, 389 N.Y.S.2d 660 (3d Dep't 1976).
117. The referee required that the mortgagee "bid in the property," meaning that the
purchase of the mortgaged property was for the full amount of the debt. Id.
118. It is unclear why the referee succeeded in forcing the mortgagee to bid at sale. Had
a purchaser made a higher bid than the mortgagee, the sale proceeds would have first been
used to satisfy the judgment of foreclosure. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
119. 55 A.D.2d at 179-80, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
120. Id. at 180, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
121. Id.
122. A mortgagee cognizant of the loss/foreclosure rules discussed above may not proceed
with a foreclosure sale. Compare Grady v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 69 A.D.2d 668, 419
N.Y.S.2d 565 (2d Dep't 1979) with Whitestone Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Allstate Ins. Co., 28
N.Y.2d 332, 270 N.E.2d 694, 321 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1971).
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fire.'23 It is unclear whether this means that the mortgagee's "inter-
est as it appears" is frozen at the moment his security is damaged
or destroyed or whether disbursements made by the mortgagee sub-
sequent to the damage are included in the insurable interest.
Grady did not reach this issue because the loss occurred subse-
quent to the entry of the judgment of foreclosure.
If Grady is construed to hold that only debts recognized by judg-
ment at the moment of fire may compose the mortgagee's lien, in-
equities will clearly result. Foreclosure expenditures, such as attor-
ney's fees and payment of taxes during the pendency of the action,
can and must be made prior to judgment. Such a construction of
Grady, however, is not consistent with the decision in Whitestone.
In Whitestone, the judgment of foreclosure included post-loss ex-
penses. Because the Whitestone court equated the mortgagee's un-
satisfied judgment'2' with his insurable interest, it effectively held
that the insurer is liable for post-loss expenses.
IV. Rationale for the Loss/Foreclosure Rules
The decisions denying a standard clause mortgagee recovery in
situations where loss precedes purchase at foreclosure have been
criticized.'2 5 It is asserted that a contract of insurance should be
construed to give full effect to the expressed intention of the par-
ties.'2 Moreover, insurance contracts are generally interpreted
strictly against the insurer and in favor of the insured and
beneficiary.'27
123. 69 A.D.2d at 674, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 569. See also National Fire Ins. Co. v. Finerty
Inv. Co., 170 Okla. 44, 46, 38 P.2d 496, 498 (1934).
124. The judgment includes post-loss expenses and disbursements made by the mortga-
gee. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Observations, supra note 39.
126. VANCE, supra note 9, at 808.
127. Id. at 809. This is consistent with the general rule that ambiguity in a contract
should be resolved to disfavor the drafter. Id.
States are sharply divided, however, on whether the usual rules for the construction of
insurance contracts should be applied to standard policies and to standard provisions. Id. A
bare majority of jurisdictions feel that since terms and conditions of the standard policy are
mandated by law, the insurance carrier cannot be regarded as having selected the operative
language and therefore should not be subjected to an unfavorable rule of construction.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Barry, 213 Ind. 56, 10 N.E.2d 614 (1937); St. Landry Wholesale
Mercantile Co. v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 114 La. 146, 38 So. 87 (1905); Mac Bey v.
Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 292 Mass. 105, 197 N.E. 516 (1935); Wilcox v. Massachusetts
Protective Ass'n, 266 Mass. 230, 165 N.E. 429 (1929); Bay Trust Co. v. Agricultural Life Ins.
Co., 279 Mich. 248, 271 N.W. 749 (1937); Del Guidici v. Importers & Exporters Ins. Co., 98
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It has been argued that what the mortgagee does subsequent to
loss in foreclosing on its lien is irrelevant to the insurer's contrac-
tual duty to pay.2 8 A policy of fire insurance is generally viewed as
a personal contract, which "does not attach to the property insured
nor in any manner run with the land."' 29 Where the policy contains
a clause directing that recovery for any loss be payable to a named
mortgagee, it "is not a separate insurance of the debt, but is a sep-
arate security for the debt.' 30 Therefore, the mortgagee should be
able to look to the security provided by the policy to make it whole
and entire. 31
The courts in New York recognize the general rule that the stan-
dard mortgage clause operates to create a separate contract of in-
surance between the mortgagee and insurer' 3 but the effect of
Whitestone and Moke is to deny that a separate contract exists.
Unlike the decision in Calvert, the New York cases apply real prop-
erty law, governing the relationship between mortgagor and mort-
gagee, to an essentially contractual relationship between mortgagee
and insurer. 3 3 By such application, the real property law can work
N.J.L. 435, 120 A. 5 (1923); Solomon v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 43 R.I. 154, 165 A. 214
(1933); Frozine v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 195 Wis. 494, 218 N.W. 845 (1928). Other
courts have seen these policies "not as legislative enactments but as voluntary contracts"
and give the benefit of any doubt to the insured. Dunton v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 104
Me. 372, 71 A. 1037 (1908); Matthews v. American Central Ins. Co., 154 N.Y. 449, 48 N.E.
751 (1897); Blue Bird Cab Co. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 219 N.C. 788, 15 S.E.2d 295
(1941); Chauvin v. Superior Fire Ins. Co., 283 Pa. 397, 129 A. 326 (1925); Straw v. Integrity
Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Wis. 96, 20 N.W.2d 707 (1945); Ruffino v. Queen Ins. Co. v. O'Bannon,
170 S.W. 1055 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), aff'd, 109 Tex. 281, 206 S.W. 814 (1918).
Such courts cite the influence the insurance industry exerts in the drafting state of
standard fire policy legislation. VANCE, supra note 9, at 810.
128. E.g., Brief for Appellant, Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 291 Ala. 193,
279 So. 2d 460 (1973); Brief for Appellant, Whitestone Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 28 N.Y.2d 332, 270 N.E.2d 694, 321 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1971).
129. Galante v. Hathaway Bakeries, Inc., 6 A.D.2d 142, 149, 176 N.Y.S.2d 87, 94 (3d
Dep't 1958).
130. Andrello v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 29 A.D.2d 489, 493, 289 N.Y.S.2d 293,
297 (4th Dep't 1968) (quoting Fields v. Western Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 290 N.Y. 209,
214, 48 N.E.2d 489, 491 (1943)).
131. Brief for Appellant at 9, Whitestone Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Allstate Ins. Co., 28
N.Y.2d 332, 270 N.E.2d 694, 321 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1971).
132. See Whitestone Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Allstate Ins. Co., 28 N.Y.2d 332, 270
N.E.2d 694, 321 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1971); Grady v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 69 A.D.2d 668, 419
N.Y.S.2d 565 (2d Dep't 1979); Moke Realty Corp. v. Whitestone Say. & Loan Ass'n, 82
Misc. 2d 396, 370 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 1005, 382 N.Y.S.2d 289 (2d
Dep't 1976), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 954, 363 N.E.2d.365, 394 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1977).
133. See note 132 supra.
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to defeat an otherwise valid, executory contract. This occurs when
the mechanics of the deficiency judgment statute extinguish recov-
ery rights arising under the insurance contract.
The Moke decision is apparently premised upon two bases: 1) a
desire to avoid delay in the prosecution of the foreclosure action
and 2) a desire to clear title to the mortgaged premises as quickly
as possible. Both of these goals, however, can be realized without
using the deficiency judgment statute as a catalyst. First, the stat-
ute of limitations on the contract action or an analogous time limit
in the policy under which claims must be filed will guard against
undue delay in bringing claims against the insurer. Second, the
mortgagee who has bid in the property and become owner is likely
to resell the same as soon as he can. Therefore, there is little likeli-
hood that a cloud will remain on title for any significant length of
time.
It is also argued that to allow a mortgagee who has had his debt
fully satisfied at foreclosure to collect on insurance proceeds would
amount to a double recovery.'34 This argument presumes that the
actual market value of the premises which the mortgagee
purchases at foreclosure sale is always equal to the amount of his
bid. However, this fiction ignores the fact that, because of anti-
deficiency legislation, the mortgagee is frequently compelled to of-
fer a bid greater than the amount for which he can later resell the
premises.' 35 In a case like Whitestone, the mortgagee would not ob-
tain a double recovery by receiving insurance proceeds in addition
to its fee interest. Rather, the insurer is unjustly enriched if it is
not liable to the mortgagor or some third person.' 36
Furthermore, it is illogical to characterize as double recovery the
excess of the resale price over the mortgagee's purchase price. Such
excess is more properly considered a capital gain on the sale of real
property. There is no danger that a mortgagee can successfully
make a bid for less than fair market value in order to increase his
profit and receive insurance proceeds on the deficiency because,
under anti-deficiefiy legislation, a court will grant a deficiency
judgment based upon the perceived fair market value of the prem-
ises. Theoretically, the mortgagee will receive no benefit from the
134. Whitestone Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Allstate Ins. Co., 28 N.Y.2d 332, 270 N.E.2d
694, 321 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1971).
135. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
136. 28 N.Y.2d at 343, 270 N.E.2d at 700, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 870 (Scileppi, J., dissenting).
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"forced nature" of the foreclosure sale." 7
The most cogent justification for the Whitestone rule is the pre-
sumption that the mortgagee is in a better position than the insur-
ance company to know the condition of premises forming the secur-
ity for his lien. The mortgagee is under no duty to commence
foreclosure proceedings and could have recovered from the insurer
instead of his debtor. 3 Therefore, if the remedy chosen is foreclo-
sure, the mortgagee should not be later heard to complain that his
choice was unwise.
V. Conclusion
The rules governing fire insurance recovery rights of the foreclos-
ing mortgagee may appear to be a viable solution to apportionment
of indemnity. However, when the rules are applied to deny recovery
to mortgagees properly insured against the loss sustained, the sys-
tem of justice has failed.
It is clear that a mortgagee's insurable interest is reduced to the
extent that his lien upon the premises has been satisfied. This
principle is a sound one. What is perhaps illogical is the fiction
that the mortgagee's bid at foreclosure sale equals the value of the
premises he is receiving in exchange. Such equality often does not
exist because the practical difficulty in obtaining a deficiency judg-
ment encourages some mortgagees to bid in the amount of their
liens even where the premises are worth less than such liens.
Hence, the mortgagee who holds a foreclosure sale may never fully
recover his investment: if his bid is low, the law effectively may
deny him recovery by reducing his deficiency judgment; if he bids
an amount greater than the premises are worth, the market may
refuse to pay on resale what the mortgagee paid at auction.
The judicious mortgagee who has had his security interest dam-
aged or destroyed and has a right to recover insurance proceeeds
thereon would be well advised simply to refrain from foreclosing,
file a claim, and let the carrier be subrogated to his lien. But
should the mortgagee have commenced foreclosure and hold an un-
satisfied judgment on the date of the fire, he should surely avoid
the sale.
J. Burke McCormick
137. See notes 97-100 supra and accompanying text.
138. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
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